Application of Higher Mathematics (based on the textbook by Sokolenko A.I., 2002) to the Cryptanalysis of ECDSA in Bitcoin Transactions

22.10.2026

A.I. Sokolenko’s textbook  “Higher Mathematics”  is a fundamental course covering linear algebra, analytic geometry, probability theory, and mathematical statistics. Although it’s not directly devoted to cryptography, its mathematical apparatus is applicable to ECDSA cryptanalysis:

  • Linear algebra  (Cramer’s method, determinants, systems of linear equations) provides a rigorous justification for the nonce reuse attack and allows for formalizing the recovery k And d.
  • Probability theory and statistics  make it possible to detect biases in nonce generation and estimate the number of signatures required for a successful attack.
  • Analytical geometry  provides a geometric interpretation of the problem: each signature is a line in space (k,d), and the attack on biased nonces is to find a short vector in the lattice.

A practical implementation shows that, given a vulnerability (a duplicate nonce or a known offset), a Bitcoin wallet’s private key can be recovered in polynomial time. This highlights the critical importance of correct nonce generation in cryptographic applications.

Content

1. Introduction

Cryptanalysis of the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) is one of the most sought-after areas of modern applied mathematics. Bitcoin, the largest cryptocurrency, uses ECDSA over an elliptic curve  secp256k1 to sign transactions. The security of this scheme is based on the difficulty of the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem (ECDLP). However, there is a class of attacks that do not directly solve ECDLP but exploit weaknesses in the generation  of the nonce  —a one-time secret parameter used to create each signature.

Sokolenko A.I.’s textbook  “Higher Mathematics” (Moscow: Academy, 2002)  covers elements of analytical geometry, mathematical analysis, probability theory, and mathematical statistics.[reference:0] Although the textbook is aimed at students majoring in non-mathematical fields and does not directly cover the theory of elliptic curves or cryptography, its mathematical apparatus—linear algebra, probability theory, and analytical geometry—proves surprisingly useful for understanding and implementing cryptanalytic attacks on ECDSA.

Key Idea:  If an attacker obtains information about a nonce k

 (full disclosure, reuse, partial leakage of high or low bits), private key d

 can be restored. Sokolenko’s textbook provides tools for formalizing and solving the corresponding systems of equations and statistical problems.

2. Mathematical foundations of ECDSA

Let’s consider an elliptic curve E over a finite field Fp, given by the Weierstrass equation:y2≡x3+ax+b(modp)

Let G — generator point of prime order n (For  secp256k1: p=2256–232–977, n — a prime number close to 2256). Private key d∈[1,n–1], public key Q=dG.

Algorithm for generating a signature for a message with a hash h=H(m):

  1. A random number is selected k∈[1,n–1] —  nonce .
  2. The point is calculated R=kG, her x– the coordinate is taken modulo n: r=x(R)modn.
  3. It is being calculated s=k–1(h+r⋅d)modn.
  4. Signature – couple (r,s).

The signature equation can be rewritten as:(1)s⋅k≡h+r⋅d(modn)

This is a linear comparison of relatively unknowns k And dThis is the basis for all the attacks discussed below.

3. Hidden number (nonce) and its role

Parameter k is called  a nonce  (number used once). It is critical that k was:

  • Secret  – otherwise the attacker will immediately figure it out d=(sk–h)r–1modn.
  • Unique  – reusable k for two different messages makes the system of equations solvable.
  • Uniformly distributed  – offsets in the least significant or most significant bits allow statistical attacks.

Historical examples:  In 2010, Sony used a constant nonce in PlayStation 3 signatures, which led to master key recovery.[reference:1] Numerous Android Bitcoin wallets suffered from a random number generator weakness that led to reuse. k

.[reference:2]

4. Methods for recovering a private key

4.1 Nonce Reuse

Let for two messages with hashes h1 And h2 the same one was used k. Then from (1):s1k≡h1+rd(modn)s2k≡h2+rd(modn)

Subtracting the second equation from the first:(s1–s2)k≡h1–h2(modn)

From here the nonce is restored:(2)k≡(h1–h2)(s1–s2)–1(modn)

Then the private key:(3)d≡(s1k–h1)r–1(modn)

The mathematical essence:  we solved a system of two linear comparisons with two unknowns k And dThis is a classical problem in linear algebra over a ring. Zn.

4.2 Biased Nonce and the Hidden Number Problem (HNP)

In practice, a complete match k — rare. However, if the nonce is generated with  an offset  (for example, the high-order bits are always zero, or the length k less than expected), an attack based on  the Hidden Number Problem  (HNP) can be used.

Let for each signature i it is known that ki lies in a certain interval: 0≤ki<2B, Where B<log2⁡n (For example, B=224 instead of 256). Let’s rewrite the signature equation:ki=si–1(hi+rid)modn

Condition ki<2B means that the value si–1(hi+rid)modn should be “small.” This can be reformulated as:d⋅(risi–1)–ki≡–hisi–1(modn)

Let us denote ti=risi–1modn, ui=hisi–1modn. Then:d⋅ti–ki≡–ui(modn),0≤ki<2B

We have obtained a system of linear comparisons with small unknowns kiThis is an instance of HNP, which is solved by lattice theory methods.[reference:3][reference:4]

4.3 Lattice-based attacks (LLL/BKZ)

The lattice method reduces HNP to the shortest vector problem (SVP) or bounded distance decoding problem (BDD). A lattice is constructed L dimensions m+1, generated by the rows of the matrix:B=(n00⋯00t110⋯00t201⋯00⋮⋮⋮⋱⋮⋮tm00⋯10u100⋯02B/n)

After basis reduction, the LLL (Lenstra–Lenstra–Lovász) algorithm finds a short vector containing d in one of the coordinates. Construction details and success parameters depend on the number of signatures m, leak size B and the order of the curve n.[reference:5][reference:6]

5. Application of concepts from the textbook by Sokolenko A.I.

5.1 Linear Algebra: Solving Systems of Linear Equations

Sokolenko’s textbook contains sections on matrix theory, determinants, and methods for solving systems of linear algebraic equations (Cramer’s method, Gauss’s method).[reference:7] These tools are directly applicable to nonce reuse attacks.

The system (2)–(3) can be written in matrix form:(s1–rs2–r)(kd)≡(h1h2)(modn)

Determinant of a matrix Δ=s1(–r)–s2(–r)=r(s2–s1). If gcd(Δ,n)=1 (which is fulfilled with high probability, since n — simple), the system has a unique solution modulo nCramer’s method yields:k≡children(h1–rh2–r)Δ≡r(h2–h1)r(s2–s1)≡(h1–h2)(s1–s2)–1(modn)

which coincides with (2). Similarly for dThus,  Cramer’s method and the theory of determinants from Sokolenko’s textbook provide a rigorous justification for the correctness of the attack .

5.2. Probability Theory and Mathematical Statistics

The probability theory section of Sokolenko’s textbook[reference:8] is useful for analyzing  biased nonces . If the random number generator is defective (for example, the most significant bit is always 0), then the distribution k ceases to be uniform on [0,n–1] and is concentrated in the subinterval [0,2B–1].

A statistical test for uniformity (chi-square test, Kolmogorov–Smirnov test) allows us to detect such a bias in a sample of signatures. Formally, if k∼Uniform[0,n–1], then the probability of falling into the interval [0,2B–1] equal 2B/n≈2–(256–B). At B=224 this probability is 2–32, that is, extremely small. If among m the share of “short” nonce signatures is statistically significantly higher 2–32, this indicates vulnerability.

Moreover, probability theory allows us to estimate  the number of signatures required  for a successful HNP-based attack. Empirical estimates show that in the event of a leak l nonce bits required approximately m≈256/l signatures for secure key recovery using LLL.[reference:9]

5.3 Analytical Geometry: Geometric Interpretation

Elements of analytical geometry from Sokolenko’s textbook[reference:10] allow one to visualize the problem. Equation (1) can be viewed as the equation of a straight line in a plane. (k,d):s⋅k–r⋅d=h(modn)

Each signature defines a line. Two signatures with the same k give two parallel lines, the intersection of which determines a point (k,d). For shifted nonces, the lines are “almost parallel”, and the reconstruction problem d becomes the problem of finding the point closest to the origin in a multidimensional space, which is solved by lattice methods.

Geometrically, a lattice L is a discrete set of points in Rm+1. Vector corresponding to the true d, is “short” because its coordinates are associated with ki, are limited by the value 2BThe LLL algorithm searches for such a short vector by successively decreasing the lattice basis (analogous to the Gram–Schmidt orthogonalization process studied in the linear algebra course).

6. Practical implementation

Below is a Python example demonstrating a nonce reuse attack. The code uses the  ecdsa curve  library secp256k1.

import hashlib
from ecdsa import SigningKey, SECP256k1, util
from ecdsa.ellipticcurve import Point

# Параметры кривой secp256k1
n = SECP256k1.order  # порядок генераторной точки

def recover_private_key(h1, s1, h2, s2, r):
    """
    Восстановление приватного ключа при повторном использовании nonce.
    Все значения — целые числа.
    """
    # k = (h1 - h2) * (s1 - s2)^(-1) mod n
    k = ((h1 - h2) * pow(s1 - s2, -1, n)) % n
    # d = (s1 * k - h1) * r^(-1) mod n
    d = ((s1 * k - h1) * pow(r, -1, n)) % n
    return k, d

# Пример: сгенерируем ключ и две подписи с одинаковым nonce
sk = SigningKey.generate(curve=SECP256k1)
d_true = sk.privkey.secret_multiplier
print(f"Истинный приватный ключ: {d_true}")

# Искусственно используем один и тот же nonce k
k_fixed = 12345678901234567890
h1 = int.from_bytes(hashlib.sha256(b"message1").digest(), 'big')
h2 = int.from_bytes(hashlib.sha256(b"message2").digest(), 'big')

# r = (k*G).x mod n
G = SECP256k1.generator
R = k_fixed * G
r = R.x() % n

# s_i = k^{-1}(h_i + r*d) mod n
s1 = (pow(k_fixed, -1, n) * (h1 + r * d_true)) % n
s2 = (pow(k_fixed, -1, n) * (h2 + r * d_true)) % n

# Атака
k_rec, d_rec = recover_private_key(h1, s1, h2, s2, r)
print(f"Восстановленный nonce: {k_rec}")
print(f"Восстановленный приватный ключ: {d_rec}")
print(f"Совпадение: {d_rec == d_true}")

An attack against biased nonces requires an LLL implementation. Below is a conceptual example of constructing a lattice for HNP (without a full LLL implementation, which is available in libraries  fpylll or  olll):

from fpylll import IntegerMatrix, LLL

def build_hnp_lattice(t_list, u_list, n, B):
    """
    Строит решётку для HNP.
    t_list, u_list: списки целых чисел (t_i = r_i * s_i^{-1} mod n, u_i = h_i * s_i^{-1} mod n)
    B: верхняя граница для nonce (k_i < 2^B)
    """
    m = len(t_list)
    # Размерность m+1
    M = IntegerMatrix(m + 1, m + 1)
    # Первая строка: n в (0,0)
    M[0, 0] = n
    # Заполняем строки 1..m
    for i in range(m):
        M[i + 1, 0] = t_list[i]
        M[i + 1, i + 1] = 1
    # Последняя строка для масштабирования
    scale = 1 << B
    for i in range(m):
        M[m, i + 1] = u_list[i] * scale // n
    # Редукция LLL
    LLL.reduction(M)
    # После редукции ищем строку, содержащую d в первой координате
    # (детали проверки опущены)
    return M

7. Conclusion

A.I. Sokolenko’s textbook  “Higher Mathematics”  is a fundamental course covering linear algebra, analytic geometry, probability theory, and mathematical statistics. Although not directly devoted to cryptography, its mathematical apparatus is applicable to ECDSA cryptanalysis:

  • Linear algebra  (Cramer’s method, determinants, systems of linear equations) provides a rigorous justification for the nonce reuse attack and allows for formalizing the recovery k And d.
  • Probability theory and statistics  make it possible to detect biases in nonce generation and estimate the number of signatures required for a successful attack.
  • Analytical geometry  provides a geometric interpretation of the problem: each signature is a line in space (k,d), and the attack on biased nonces is to find a short vector in the lattice.

Practical implementation shows that, given a vulnerability (a duplicate nonce or a known offset), a Bitcoin wallet’s private key can be recovered in polynomial time. This highlights the critical importance of correct nonce generation in cryptographic protocols.

8. Directions for further research for cryptanalysis based on this area

  1. Developing statistical methods for detecting nonce leaks.  Using mathematical statistics (goodness-of-fit criteria, Bayesian estimation) for passive blockchain analysis to identify transactions with abnormally short or correlated nonces. This will allow vulnerable wallets to be detected before an attacker exploits a leak.
  2. Lattice dimension optimization for HNP under partial leakage:  A study of the dependence of LLL/BKZ success on the number of signatures m, leak size B and the order of the curve nApplication of linear algebra methods to reduce the dimensionality of a lattice without loss of information (for example, by eliminating variables).
  3. Analysis of affine relationships between nonces.  If the attacker knows that k2=ak1+b for famous a,b, the system of equations becomes linear with respect to k1 And d. Study of generalized linear relations and their influence on the stability of ECDSA.
  4. Applying probability theory to side-channel attacks.  Modeling information leaks (execution time, energy consumption) as random variables and estimating the probability of successful key recovery given a given noise level.
  5. Geometric methods for signature visualization and clustering.  Using analytical geometry to construct multidimensional signature feature spaces and apply clustering algorithms to identify anomalies (e.g., groups of transactions with the same nonce).
  6. Extension to other cryptographic schemes.  Transferring mathematical frameworks (linear algebra, HNP) to the security analysis of Schnorr signatures, EdDSA, and other nonce-sensitive schemes.
  7. Developing security measures based on probability theory.  Creating statistical tests for random number generators used in wallets to prevent nonce leaks during key generation.

This document is based on an analysis of A.I. Sokolenko’s textbook “Higher Mathematics” (2002) and modern research in the field of ECDSA cryptanalysis. All formulas and code examples are provided for educational purposes.