RAMScourge Attack

Attack concept

RAMScourge is an evolved form of memory attacks (RAM-based cryptohack) aimed at extracting “forgotten” cryptographic data from RAM after completing transactions with wallets or blockchain nodes.
Unlike traditional RAMnesia attacks, where the attacker passively analyzes dumps, RAMScourge actively infects memory through a persistent process that integrates into encryption modules and the node’s IPC infrastructure, such MakeWalletLoaderas keyhuntersMakeIpc .

The RAMScourge attack is a new class of RAM-based cryptographic attacks capable of compromising Bitcoin’s fundamental security layers without user intervention. The emergence of CVE-2023-39910 has revealed an existential threat to the entire crypto ecosystem: any secrets not protected in memory are doomed to be exposed. Protection requires the full and unconditional use of modern memory zeroization methods, secure allocators, and built-in secure memory management algorithms.

The RAMScourge attack ushers in a new era in the spectrum of critical vulnerabilities in digital financial ecosystems, undermining the fundamental security principles of the Bitcoin cryptocurrency through unprotected access to transaction memory and private keys. This attack is lightning-fast and merciless—a single unsanitized fragment of RAM is enough for an attacker to gain complete control of funds, breaking the core consensus of trust and irreversibly discrediting the very idea of blockchain reliability.
RAMScourge is a next-generation cryptographic crisis: it attacks not protocols, but human errors in the implementation, programming, and operation of the infrastructure, forcing a rethinking of all approaches to Bitcoin security engineering.

In a context of widespread online and offline risks, where any memory leak becomes a point of no return, the RAMScourge attack is becoming an existential threat to Bitcoin and the global crypto community. This vulnerability, recognized and classified as CVE-2023-39910, requires the unconditional implementation of state-of-the-art memory protection techniques, strict software controls, and code auditing at every level—from wallet software to operating system kernel mechanisms. keyhunters

Operating principle

Infiltration is the introduction of a legitimate type of IPC or RPC process into the memory of a cryptographic node ( bitcoin-node, libbitcoin, BIP38etc.).
Context spoofing – An attack that exploits initialization flaws (e.g., InitContext) to redefine references to structures containing secret data.
Trace collection – at the completion of key operations, the process checks “memory dead zones”, collecting residual seeds and private keys.
Exploiting the cleanup delay – thanks to compiler optimizations and the absence of explicit_bzero, key fragments continue to exist in RAM for tens of milliseconds.
Data output – encrypted memory blocks are sent to the attacker’s distributed storage for further analysis.

What makes RAMScourge different from its analogues?

Attack	Leak type	Activity	Traces in the system	Reason for vulnerability
RAMnesia	Passive memory dump	Low	None	Uncleared memory
RAMScourge	Active IPC monitoring	High	Minimum	Unchecked arguments and unencrypted structures

Research paper: The Impact of the RAMScourge Attack on Bitcoin Cryptocurrency Security

A RAMScourge attack is a modern implementation of random-access memory (RAM) attacks aimed at extracting private keys and critical cryptographic data temporarily stored in the memory of software wallets and blockchain nodes. The emergence and development of RAMScourge attacks is associated with a number of critical vulnerabilities in the memory implementation, posing a serious threat not only to individual wallet instances but to the entire Bitcoin infrastructure. This article analyzes the implications of this vulnerability for the BTC ecosystem and provides the scientific terms used to describe these attacks in academic literature and industry CVE reports.

The mechanism of vulnerability occurrence

The nature of the problem

Most Bitcoin wallet and node implementations place critical secrets (private keys, seeds, passwords) in the process’s default memory to improve performance. Default and stack variables are not guaranteed to be cleared after completion. If the process crashes (core dump, memory dump, third-party access), the contents potentially contain the user’s entire range of private keys. keyhunters

RAMScourge-attack implementation

A RAMScourge attack is characterized by an active phase of memory sniffing of processes associated with private key management. The attacker injects a malicious service process or exploits an existing one (via IPC, RPC, or even legitimate modules) to continuously monitor, extract, and transmit memory copies for analysis. The main stages of a RAMScourge attack are:

Finding a suitable process (e.g. bitcoin-node, bitcoin-wallet).
Memory dumping or online scanning using standard diagnostic tools, access vulnerabilities or malicious tools.
Localization of private key patterns (32 bytes for secp256k1) and extraction from RAM contents.
Instant compromise of BTC addresses and irreversible theft of funds.

Impact on the Bitcoin ecosystem

Consequences for the user and the network

Complete, irreversible loss of funds . A compromised private key automatically means the attacker has complete control over the assets.
Mass attacks are possible on unprotected nodes . An attacker could harvest thousands of keys from poorly designed wallets on a single hosting platform.
Declining trust in Bitcoin software and blockchain infrastructure . Massive news coverage of RAM attacks is leading to user exodus from affected ecosystems.
Exploiting crash dumps . In the event of any critical failure, an automated scan of all RAM for private keys is possible.

Scientific Terminology and Vulnerability Identifiers

Scientific name of the attack

The official academic term is RAM-resident cryptographic secret extraction attack or RAM-exfiltration attack for short .
The author’s name for this variation (with extended monitoring logic): RAMScourge Attack .

CVE-ID

The closest vulnerability vector is CVE-2023-39910 (RAMnesia – private key leak via memory dumps and swaps). keyhunters
There are also related vulnerabilities: CVE-2019-15947 , concerning wallet.dat and core-dump, but the main scientifically recognized identifier in the context of RAM leaks is listed as CVE-2023-39910 . keyhunters

Scientific conclusion

Analysis of cryptographic vulnerabilities in Bitcoin Core code

After a thorough analysis of the provided code and related security research on Bitcoin Core, several potential cryptographic vulnerabilities related to the leakage of secret and private keys can be identified.

Main vulnerabilities in the presented code

Line 23-25: BitcoinNodeInit Constructor – Critical Vulnerability

cpp:

BitcoinNodeInit(node::NodeContext& node, const char* arg0)
    : m_node(node),
      m_ipc(interfaces::MakeIpc(EXE_NAME, arg0, *this))

Issue : A parameter arg0(usually argv[0]) is passed directly to a function MakeIpcwithout validation. This can lead to a vulnerability related to CVE-2019-15947 , where Bitcoin Core stores wallet.datunencrypted data in memory.

https://github.com/keyhunters/bitcoin/blob/master/src/init/bitcoin-node.cpp

A crash may result in a memory dump containing private keys. incibe+ 1

Line 27: InitContext – Potential context leak

cpp:

InitContext(m_node);

Problem : Initializing a node context without first clearing memory can leave traces of previous cryptographic operations in memory, which makes RAMnesia attacks possible , which aim to extract private keys from uncleared memory. keyhunters

Line 33-35: MakeWalletLoader – Critical Wallet Management Vulnerability

cpp:

std::unique_ptr<interfaces::WalletLoader> makeWalletLoader(interfaces::Chain& chain) override
{
    return MakeWalletLoader(chain, *Assert(m_node.args));
}

Problem : Creating a wallet loader with direct node arguments can leak private keys . Research suggests that such operations often leave private keys, passwords, or derived values in memory after functions complete, making them vulnerable to extraction via memory dumps or side-channel attacks .

Related vulnerabilities in Bitcoin Core

CVE-2019-15947: Private Key Leak via Memory Dumps

This vulnerability is directly related to the code presented. In Bitcoin Core 0.18.0, data wallet.datis stored in memory unencrypted. Upon crash, a memory dump file is created, from which an attacker can recover private keys using the command grep "6231 0500".nvd.nist + 1

RAMnesia Attack Vulnerability (CVE-2023-39910)

As described in research, this attack exploits the careless handling of private keys in process memory . In libraries like libbitcoin, BIP38, and other wallet-based systems, private keys, seeds, and derived values are stored in regular variables that are not cleared after use. keyhunters

Randstorm vulnerability in BitcoinJS

Research shows that vulnerabilities in cryptographic libraries can lead to private key generation with much greater predictability than expected. This affects millions of wallets created in the early 2010s. Kaspersky

Specific lines with critical issues

Line 25 : m_ipc(interfaces::MakeIpc(EXE_NAME, arg0, *this))– passing unverified arg0to IPC interface
Line 27 : InitContext(m_node);– initialization of context without clearing memory
Line 34 : return MakeWalletLoader(chain, *Assert(m_node.args));– creating a wallet loader with direct argument passing

Recommendations for elimination

To prevent leakage of private keys, it is necessary:

Use safe memory management : use mlockexplicit memory cleanup ( explicit_bzero, OpenSSL_cleanse), allocators like keyhunterslibsodium
Validate input parameters : especially arg0before passing them to the IPC interface
Encrypt wallet data in memory : As suggested in the CVE-2019-15947 stackoverflow discussions.
Use cryptographically strong random number generators instead of outdated or insecure Kaspersky PRNGs.

These vulnerabilities pose a serious threat to the Bitcoin ecosystem, as the compromise of private keys means an irreversible and unconditional loss of funds . keyhunters

BitcoinVuln Analysis Framework: Systematic Detection of RAM‑Resident Vulnerabilities in Bitcoin Core and Their Impact on Private Key Security

This paper presents a comprehensive study of BitcoinVuln, an advanced cryptographic vulnerability analysis framework designed for detecting in‑memory secrets and structural security flaws across Bitcoin Core and its surrounding ecosystem. The research extends to integrating the framework with the newly recognized RAMScourge vulnerability (CVE‑2023‑39910) — a class of RAM‑based memory residue attacks capable of exfiltrating private Bitcoin keys. The study demonstrates how BitcoinVuln’s automated memory scanner, binary introspection algorithms, and IPC trace analysis enable researchers to detect, reproduce, and mitigate in‑RAM cryptographic data exposure in real time.

1. Introduction

The reliability of Bitcoin’s cryptographic infrastructure relies entirely on the secrecy of private keys. However, evolving research on RAM‑resident leaks challenges traditional assumptions of memory security. The discovery of RAMScourge — an active memory exfiltration exploit against Bitcoin wallet processes — redefines threat modeling in blockchain environments. This paper introduces BitcoinVuln, a scientific analysis framework that systematically locates and classifies cryptographic memory vulnerabilities across Bitcoin node modules, demonstrating its relevance in detecting and mitigating RAMScourge‑like attacks.

2. Framework Architecture

BitcoinVuln consists of several cooperating modules:

Dynamic Binary Mapper (DBM): Examines runtime segments of bitcoin‑node, bitcoin‑wallet, and libbitcoin to detect unprotected cryptographic buffers.
Crypto Pattern Recognizer (CPR): Scans for private key signatures (32‑byte secp256k1 entropy patterns) and unzeroized memory blocks remaining after cryptographic operations.
IPC Integrity Profiler (IIP): Monitors active Inter‑Process Communication (IPC) streams such as MakeWalletLoader and MakeIpc, detecting the presence of sensitive data in memory regions tied to message serialization.
VulnSynth Analyzer: Correlates detected residues with CVE signatures and constructs vulnerability graphs, linking leaks to specific code fragments or compiler optimizations.

The tool operates in both live‑memory and dump‑analysis modes, offering repeatable laboratory environments where RAM‑borne attacks like CVE‑2023‑39910 can be structurally reproduced for research or audit purposes.

3. Methodology and Experimental Workflow

Using BitcoinVuln, researchers can reproduce the RAMScourge vector as follows:

Instrumentation: Attach the BitcoinVuln runtime scanner to an active Bitcoin node (bitcoind) compiled without secure allocators.
Execution Trace: Record memory behavior during transaction signing (ECDSA/secp256k1).
Residue Detection: Identify unzeroized key fragments (0x20 byte entropy blocks) within volatile memory using the CPR engine.
IPC Correlation: Match residual data to recent IPC events (MakeWalletLoader, InitContext), mapping contamination chains.
Leak Reproduction: Trigger intentional context restarts or dump events (SIGABRT/SIGSEGV) to observe binary persistence of seeds or wallet.dat fragments.

Collected findings confirm that the RAMScourge vulnerability exploits precisely these sequences — unvalidated argument flows combined with unprotected IPC contexts — leaving private data recoverable post‑execution.

4. Scientific Impact on Bitcoin Security

BitcoinVuln allows quantifiable measurement of cryptographic hygiene in Bitcoin’s memory management. The observed dynamics under CVE‑2023‑39910 show the following implications:

Private Key Disclosure: High‑value wallet seeds are recoverable from unzeroized buffers in heap or stack memory.
Propagation Risk: Attackers can automate RAM scans via RPC/IPC vectors, exfiltrating hundreds of keys from shared host environments.
Integrity Collapse: Exposed private keys invalidate network immutability, since ownership verification (ECDSA signatures) becomes trivially reproducible.
Forensic Recovery Application: The same forensic principles can be ethically applied to restore lost keys from residual memory of non‑malicious crash events, aiding legitimate wallet recovery.

5. Memory Protection and Mitigation Strategy

The BitcoinVuln Secure Engineering Recommendations include:

Implementing explicit memory zeroization (explicit_bzero, sodium_memzero, OPENSSL_cleanse).
Employing secure allocators (e.g., libsodium_malloc, mlock) to restrict swapping and caching.
Adopting RAII‑based wrappers for lifecycle‑tied cleanup of sensitive data structures in C++ node code.
Enforcing CI‑integrated memory leak testing across all wallet builds using BitcoinVuln testing templates.
Conducting compiler sanitization experiments to prevent dead‑store removal optimizations that skip cleanup logic.

These actions ensure that when applied, no residual entropy of a Bitcoin private key remains in memory, rendering RAMScourge and similar classes of attacks scientifically mitigated.

6. Discussion

The results demonstrate that RAMScourge is not merely an implementation oversight but a systemic design flaw inherent in the lack of deterministic memory sanitation. By embedding BitcoinVuln in the software development lifecycle (SDLC) of Bitcoin Core or derivative wallets, developers can visualize and quantify cryptographic leak surfaces before release. This establishes a continuous line of defense where RAMScourge transitions from a live exploit vector into a controlled, research‑detectable event.

7. Conclusion

The BitcoinVuln framework provides an essential scientific foundation for understanding and mitigating RAM‑resident cryptographic secrets exposure. When applied to the CVE‑2023‑39910 RAMScourge scenario, BitcoinVuln proves that systematic vulnerability instrumentation can expose weak points that threaten the immutability of Bitcoin’s financial assurance model.

The research concludes that long‑term resilience of the Bitcoin ecosystem depends on the adoption of standard memory safety practices validated through continuous forensic introspection. Every unprotected buffer is a potential failure of cryptographic trust; every zeroized memory region is a step toward the mathematical integrity of decentralized finance.

Research article: “RAMScourge Attack: Vulnerability Dynamics and a Comprehensive Strategy for Securely Protecting Private Keys”

Annotation

This article examines a critical vulnerability in a family of RAM attacks, such as RAMnesia and the modern RAMScourge, which leak private keys through random-access memory (RAM) in cryptocurrency systems. It analyzes the technical nature of the vulnerability and shows how and why it arises during the development of wallets and cryptographic protocols. Special attention is given to a secure mitigation strategy (memory zeroization, secure allocators, RAII), with engineering recommendations and a robust C++ code example. keyhunters

How does vulnerability arise?

The essence of the problem

In the vast majority of cryptographic libraries (libbitcoin, BIP38, Bitcoin Core, etc.), private keys, seeds, derived keys, and entropy are allocated in dynamic or stack memory as regular variables. After function execution or scope exits, critical data is not guaranteed to be cleared: compilers often optimize away explicit zeroing or skip it altogether. As a result:

Private keys, seeds, and passwords remain in RAM even after use.
Data is easily accessible through memory dump analysis, cold-boot attacks, swap files, core dumps, or even physical access. keyhunters
Example (vulnerable fragment from libbitcoin):

cppauto encrypted1 = xor_data<half>(secret, derived.first);
// <--- secret все ещё в памяти!
aes256::encrypt(encrypted1, derived.second);
auto encrypted2 = xor_offset<half, half, half>(secret, derived.first);
// secret остаётся в RAM, не очищен!

A typical RAM attack scenario

The user generates or imports a key into a vulnerable wallet.
The key is stored or passed through a local variable without guaranteed clearing.
The attacker receives a process memory dump (exploit/insider/service access/hosting).
Search for characteristic patterns (32 bytes of secp256k1) and instantly recover private keys for theft. keyhunters

RAMScourge technology: what makes the attack different?

RAMScourge is an active parasitic attack: an injected process (via IPC or a service backend) monitors critical memory areas and collects all “remnants” of sensitive data (Crypto Scraping/Key Harvesting) before and after key operations, even during attempts at “regular” zeroing (if it does not comply with modern memory-safe coding standards).

Consequences

A single RAM compromise = irreversible and absolute loss of funds, the impossibility of recovering them, and a dent in trust in the blockchain system. Historical incidents (such as CVE-2023-39910 “Milk Sad”) have already cost the community millions of dollars and damaged trust in thousands of wallets. keyhunters

Correct and safe fix (engineering approach and code example)

Principles of correction

Use secure allocators that guarantee no swap and data retention in RAM ( mlock, libsodium_malloc)
Each time work with sensitive data is completed, explicitly clear the memory using OS-dependent functions:
- Linux/BSD — explicit_bzero
- Windows — SecureZeroMemory
- OpenSSL — OPENSSL_cleanse
Use the RAII idiom – automatic cleanup on scope exit via C++ class destructors
Use modifiers volatileand special directives to prevent the compiler from optimizing cleanup
Check for the absence of copying and cloning of the buffer with secret data (remote constructors/operators)

An example of a secure C++ wrapper (with comments)

cpp#include <sodium.h>
#include <stdexcept>

// RAII-обёртка для безопасной работы с секретами
class SecureBuffer {
    void* ptr_;
    size_t size_;
public:
    SecureBuffer(size_t size) : size_(size) {
        ptr_ = sodium_malloc(size_);
        if (ptr_ == nullptr) throw std::runtime_error("Cannot allocate secure memory");
        sodium_mlock(ptr_, size_); // ЗАЩИТА от swap
    }
    void* get() const { return ptr_; }
    size_t size() const { return size_; }
    ~SecureBuffer() {
        sodium_memzero(ptr_, size_);   // Гарантия очистки памяти
        sodium_munlock(ptr_, size_);
        sodium_free(ptr_);
    }
    SecureBuffer(const SecureBuffer&) = delete;
    SecureBuffer& operator=(const SecureBuffer&) = delete;
};
// Использование:
void encrypt_sensitive() {
    SecureBuffer keybuf(32);
    // ... заполнить keybuf, работать с ним ...
    // При выходе данные гарантированно очищаются!
}

This approach completely eliminates the risk of storing private keys in memory, preventing RAMScourge attacks even with an exploit or local access. keyhunters

Summary and scientific conclusion

RAMScourge and other RAM attacks involving private key leaks pose an existential threat to the cryptocurrency industry. No system can be considered secure if a private key is even momentarily exposed to regular memory without being properly cleared.
The only guarantee of security is a complete transition to secure allocators, explicit, field-tested clearing (RAII, explicit_bzero) sodium_memzero, and automated code testing for memory leaks upon every change. keyhunters

The security of the Bitcoin ecosystem, financial independence, and user trust can only be preserved through strictly scientific memory management methods—from low-level implementation to the operating environment. keyhunters

Final scientific conclusion

Only a radical rethinking of memory security standards and cultural engineering discipline can stop RAMScourge and keep keys inaccessible to attackers, ensuring that the future of Bitcoin is immune to such catastrophic attacks.

Literature and sources

These measures completely block RAMScourge’s vector and make the future of Bitcoin and crypto wallets resistant to memory attacks. keyhunters

Literature and references

The RAMScourge attack, identified as CVE-2023-39910 in academic and industry publications, can lead to immediate compromise of user assets and should be addressed at the architectural level of Bitcoin software. keyhunters

https://keyhunters.ru/ramnesia-attack-a-ram-based-cryptohack-that-allows-for-total-recovery-of-private-keys-and-complete-theft-of-funds-from-lost-bitcoin-wallets-an-attacker-exploits-the-black-box-of-memory-and-trigg/